When there is a California divorce judgment, the California Family Code allows the parties approximately six months to set aside the judgment based on mistake, neglect, or inadvertence. Things like that. Then, after the six months are up, the only way to set aside the judgment and start over again is Family Code section 2122. This statute allows people to seek a set aside based on things like duress and mental capacity.
The problem is that the Family Code does not describe what mental incapacity or duress means. But recently, the California Court of Appeal stepped in to provide guidance in a case called Marriage of Diamond (2024) 2024 DJDAR 10521. The appeals court said that a “person lacks mental capacity within the meaning of section 2122 when the person suffers from a mental deficit that significantly impairs his or her ability to understand and appreciate the nature or consequences of his or her actions of the family law proceeding”. As a result, the three-justice panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision to deny the request of the former wife (“Susan”) (who herself was or is an attorney) to set aside her divorce judgment against the former husband (“Troy”).
Susan did present evidence that she had a mental deficit, but in the words of the appeal court, “she did not meet her burden to show she was incapable of understanding and appreciating the nature and consequences of not appearing in the dissolution proceeding over a two-year period, including the trial. Nor did she show she was incapable during that period of appearing in court (remotely), responding to discovery, responding to her attorney, or requesting an accommodation from the court. While these tasks may have been difficult for Susan due to her ongoing mental health issues, such difficulty does not rise to the level of mental incapacity”.
In this case, it was Susan who filed for divorce in 2013. She had an attorney, but that attorney was relieved in 2014 by the trial judge after claiming of lack of communication and cooperation. For the rest of the underlying case, Susan represented herself.
Between 2014 and 2015, Susan made no appearances in the case, despite service on her by Troy of discovery requests, a notice of trial, and an order awarding Troy money sanctions for Susan’s failure to make discovery responses.
The trial was on May 5, 2015, but Susan was not there. Susan was sanctioned $1,500.00 for failing to appear. Not surprisingly, Troy got what he wanted regarding child custody and child support and an equalization payment of $220,000.00 plus $16,000.00 in attorney fees. Judgment was entered on November 252, 2015.
In July 2016, Troy tried to enforce the judgment. A month later, Susan resurfaced with a new lawyer and a letter from her doctor stating Susan suffered from “’severe unstable lumbar discogenic disease with associated neuropathy and recently diagnosed seizure disorder’”. The doctor concluded it would be “’medically unwise for her to participate in any court proceedings for at least the next two to three months”. The judge still denied Susan’s request to delay the case.
Therefore, on November 21, 2016, Susan filed a request to set aside portions of the judgment based on mistake pursuant to Family Code section 2122, subdivision (e). Specifically, Susan argued that Troy had made mistakes during the trial regarding the character and value of certain property and related issues.
But the judge denied Susan’s request based on the disentitlement doctrine, which “’prevents a party from seeking assistance from the court while that party is in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts’”. The court also said the judgment was not a result of a mistake.
Susan appealed that determination and lost.
But on November 21, 2017, Susan filed a second request to set aside the judgment, this time based on duress and mental incapacity, which, like the mistake claim, was based on Family Code section 2022. Among other things, Susan claimed she was unaware of the trial, had no legal representation, and suffered duress and mental incapacity resulting from domestic violence by Troy. She further claimed that she had a low potassium level and had a serous fall and months later was diagnosed with a seizure disorder. Susan also stated she had migraines and was terrified of going out in public. Unable to pay her bills, Susan stopped opening her mail.
Susan presented evidence from two new doctors. But Troy had his own version of events and presented a declaration from the parties’ now adult child, Katherine, age 21.
A hearing was held between March 2019 and October 2021. Among the things that came out was that Susan, who once worked for the California Attorney General’s office, had not practiced law since 2000 and her license to practice had been recently suspended due to her failure to pay child support. It was also revealed that Susan did write some checks during the period before and after the judgment and sold a house and sold other items online.
Troy presented the testimony of a forensic psychiatrist, Patrick Witta, who had training in evaluation of a person’s past mental state. While Dr. Wiita did not examine Susan, he reviewed the declaration of one of her doctors and found that his opinion was unreliable and “fell far below acceptable professional standards”.
Finally, on May 25, 2022, the trial judge denied Susan’s request to set aside the 2015 judgment. In its ruling, the judge defined mental incapacity as “’a disease, defect or condition that includes an inability to understand the underlying events or processes or an inability to carry out activities in one’s rational self-interest’”. The judge found Susan’s testimony to not be credible. The judge further found the claims of mental incapacity “’are likely not true or, at most, are extreme exaggerations of Susan’s non-incapacitating underlying anxiety and depression conditions’”. The judge said that during the relevant years, “’Susan understood the nature of the marital dissolution action she had commenced . . . and understood the consequences of not attending court appearances’”.
The trial court separately addressed “duress” and said that meant the person “’was so afraid or intimidated by the wrongful act or wrongful threat that the [person] did not have the free will to refuse to consent’”. The judge said those circumstances were not present.
As stated above, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision. The justices noted that motions based on duress and mental incapacity must be brought within two years of the date of entry of judgment. The panel also noted that even before granting relief, the court must find that “the facts alleged as the grounds for relief materially affected the original outcome and that the moving party would materially benefit from the granting of the relief.” As to the legal question at issue, the appellate court stated: “we conclude a person lacks mental capacity within the meaning of section 2122 when the person suffers from a mental deficit that significantly impairs his or her ability to understand and appreciate the nature or consequences of his or her actions of the family law proceeding”. The Court went on to state that Susan probably was, as the trial judge found, “likely depressed and anxious”. But the actions she took during the relevant time period undercut her claim of mental incapacity. The justices also noted that the trial judge found one of Susan’s expert’s opinions on her medical condition was “’insufficiently robust, relying so heavily on Susan’s subsequent and largely uncorroborated history’”.
The justices also agreed with the trial judge on the “duress” issue, finding that the claim of domestic violence involved only one issue which was refuted. As the trial judge noted, Susan did not establish Troy “’engaged in stalking or coercive control’”.
The decision of the Court of Appeal was 3-0. This case arose out of Los Angeles County. Numerous judges were involved in this matter –including the Hon. Colin P. Leis, Tamara E. Hall, and Lawrence P. Riff. Judge Riff’s decisions were the ones before the Court of Appeal and which the justices affirmed.
The 32-page decision, containing 15 footnotes, will not make the New York Times best seller list but it settles the meaning of some of the terms used in Family Code section 2022. Other grounds for setting aside a judgment include “perjury” and “fraud.” Courts are probably more likely to grant set-aside requests on these grounds, because the wrongdoing is on the part of the person opposing the set aside request rather than the person, like Susan, advocating for it. But even then, the “perjury” or “fraud” must have had some impact on the substance of the judgment. By the way, the perjury or fraud is most likely to have to do with mistruths and omissions in the required declarations of disclosures required in California divorces.